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I. INTRODUCTION

In July of 1990, a sweeping federal law was enacted which is directed toward people with physical and mental disabilities, and, as will be
described, those who are perceived as having such impairments. Now
fully implemented, the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter referred to as the ADA)' is intended to address disability-based discrimination in its subtle and not so subtle forms. If this law fulfills its stated
purpose and the predictions of both those who advocated its passage as
well as those who opposed it, the ADA will touch the life of virtually
every American, and, in some unique ways, the activities of lawyers and
judges.
Like developments which continue to arise under other civil rights
laws, the full ramifications of the ADA will not be apparent for some
time. The ADA and the rules and regulations promulgated under it do
assume, however, that a new mind-set-a conviction that the way people
who have disabilities are allowed to interact in society must change-is
already in place. Approaching the ADA with that appreciation may be
difficult for those who would wish for gradual change. It does have the
advantage, however, of making this intricate law more comprehensible.
This article attempts to assist those interested in gaining an understanding of the ADA by describing some of the more significant historical
settings in which it was conceived and the objectives of disability rights.
It then describes the meaning of "individual with a disability" and the
law's primary thrust which is divided into three major titles, pertaining to
employment, public programs and services, and the accessibility of private business and commercial enterprises. Special attention is paid, within
the description of the public services title (Title II of the ADA), to the
measures which are now required of courts in conducting their activities.
The suggestion is made, among others, that traditional thinking as to the
competency and desirability of people with disabilities participating in the
judicial process as jurors must be discarded in favor of individualized
evaluations and the provision of appropriate assistance as necessary.
A. Disability Rights

II.

GENERAL OVERVIEW

Mary Johnson, editor of The Disability Rag, cogently described the

premise upon which the modern notion of disability rights is based:

1. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991), was
passed by Congress on July 13, 1990, and signed by President Bush on July 26, 1990.
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"[d]isability, is not really the cause of an undignified, harsh life. The real
cause is lack of access to buildings, jobs, transportation; segregation and
denial of services." 2 More poignantly, Justin Dart, the citizen described
by Senator Robert Dole as a driving force behind the ADA, 3 explained
that the hurdle disability rights seeks to overcome is an ancient, almost
subconscious assumption that people with disabilities are less than fully
human and, therefore, not fully eligible for the opportunities, services,
and support systems which are available to other people as a matter of
right. 4 To strengthen the rights of people with disabilities, it was argued
that a new perspective was needed. Advocates suggested that the focus
should be on capabilities rather than on disabilities. This perspective has
been described as the "enabling paradigm. "'
The National Council on the Handicapped (hereinafter referred to as
the Council), 6 lent support to this call for a paradigm shift in its report
entitled Toward Independence.7 The report, issued in 1986 in response to
a statutory mandate,8 was the result of a comprehensive review of federal
laws and programs serving people with disabilities. The Council concluded that federal disability programs reflected an over-emphasis on income
support and an under-emphasis on initiatives for equal opportunity, independence, self-sufficiency, and prevention of injury.9 These deficiencies
were described as being at odds with an approach developed more than a
quarter-century ago and preferred by the federal and many state governments, as well as by international organizations of people with disabilities.

2. Mary Johnson, Jerry's Kids, THE NATION, Sept. 14, 1992, at 232.
3. 135 CONG. REC.14,19804 (1989).
4. Statement made at hearing on H.R. Doc. 2273 held by the Subcommittee on Select Education and the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and
Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1989), and referred to by Sen. Kennedy, D.-Mass., 135 CONG.
REC. 14,19808 (1989). Justin Dart is the Chairperson of the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities and a member of the National Council on Disability.
5. James C. Dugan, The Conflict Between "Disabling" and 'Enabling" Paradigms in Law:
Sterilization, The Developmentally Disabled, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 507 (1993).
6. The National Council on the Handicapped (now known as the National Council on Disability) consists of 15 members who are appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by
the Senate. The Council was established in 1978 as an advisory board within the Department of Education. Pub. L. No. 95-602 (1978). The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1984 transformed the
Council into an independent federal agency. Pub. L. No. 98-221 (1984).
7.

NATIONAL CouNQL ON ThE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN ASESNT OF FEDERAL

LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECING PERSONs wIm DIsABILtTrs-wrmLI.,EGIANVE RECOMMENDATIONS (1986)

[hereinafter TOWARD INDEPENDENCE]. Copies of the report are available for sale from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, Gov't Printing Office Stock
Number: 052-003-01022-4. A second report, entitled ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE, was issued
by the Council in 1988.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1988).
9. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE, supra note 7, at vi.
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The approach is directed toward providing access to opportunities rather

than "taking care of" people with disabilities:"0
The older custodial attitude is typically expressed in policies
of segregation and shelter, of special treatment and separate institutions. The newer integrative approach focuses attention upon the
needs of the disabled as those of normal and ordinary people
caught at a physical and social disadvantage. The effect of

custodialism is to magnify physical differences into qualitative
distinctions; the effect of integrationism is to maximize similarity,
normality, and equality as between the disabled and the ablebodied."

The Council concluded that a number of specific deficiencies existed
in equal opportunity laws.' 2 As a result of its conclusions the Council

10. NAnONAL COUNCL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN AsEssAENT OF FEDERAL
LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECnING PERSONS WrT D1SABInLr--WrrH LEGiSLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS app.
(1986) [hereinafter TOWARD INDEPENDENCE app.]. Copies of the appendix are available for sale from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, Gov't Printing
Office Stock Number: 052-003-01023-2.
11. Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L.
REV. 809, 816 (1966).
12. See TOWARD INDEPENDENCE app., supra note 10, at A15-39. Among the deficiencies identified were the following:
- Money damages are not available in actions against state governmental entities for violations of the major Federal disability rights law pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985);
* Although many victims of employment and housing discrimination based upon race,
color, religion, sex and national origin may seek redress under federal law, victims of
disability-based discrimination have no comparable protection;
- The receipt of federal assistance does not trigger institutionwide requirements that educational facilities refrain from disability-based discrimination pursuant to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984);
* Places of public accommodation are not prohibited from discriminating on the basis of
disability as they are with respect to race, color, religion and national origin;
* The nature and extent of a federal assistance recipient's obligation to make its activities
accessible by providing "reasonable accommodation" to people with disabilities is inconsistently interpreted by federal courts;
: While the law declares that disability-based discrimination by those who receive federal
assistance is illegal, it does not define what is intended by "discrimination," (e.g., what
obligation is there to remove physical barriers, or is it acceptable to discriminate against a
person with a disability if his or her disability is not the sole reason for the act?);
* Enforcement proceedings under federal law, in those instances where disability-based
discrimination has been made illegal, is fraught with delay and there is uncertainty as to
whether private causes of action exist; and,
0 Traditional civil rights standards are not easily applied to cases of discrimination against
people with disabilities. One difference, for example, relates to employment qualification
standards. While race, sex, national origin, and religion are almost never legitimate criteria, in the case of disabilities there is a much more complex relationship between disability
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recommended enactment of a comprehensive law, having broad coverage,
and establishing clear, consistent and enforceable standards." 3 The result
came in 1990 with the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The ADA provides multiple protections to people with disabilities
and, consistent with the recommendations of Toward Independence, one
of the law's express goals is that it "provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities."' 4 When President Bush signed it into law, he was apparently of the opinion that the ADA had succeeded in this respect, and
he pronounced the law "powerful in its simplicity.""5 He said fears that
the law is too vague or costly and will lead to an explosion of litigation
were misplaced. 6 In contrast, many others have described it as less than a
model of clarity and a law which will require extensive judicial interpretation. "
Regardless of the conclusion as to draftsmanship, there appears to be
agreement that the ADA will create substantial change. It has been described as the "Emancipation Proclamation" for people with disabilities, 8
the most comprehensive federal civil rights legislation since the Civil
Rights Act of 1964," 9 and "the most sweeping piece of civil rights legislation since the Civil War era." 20

The ADA refers to 43 million members of the American population
who, on the date of its passage, were thought to have one or more physi-

and performance ability, and consequently, a more complex set of standards is required.
13.

TOWARD INDEPENDENCE, supra note 7, at vi.

14. 42 US.C. § 12101(b)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
15. Remarks on signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, PUB. PAPERS, George
Bush, Book II - July I to Dec., 31, 1990, at p.1068 (July 26, 1990).
16. Statement on signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, PUB. PAPERS, George
Bush, Book II - July I to Dec., 31, 1990, at p.1070 (July 26, 1990).
17. E.g., Emily Harrison, Officials Predict Problems with Tile I DisabilitiesAct Enforcement,
CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Mar. 20, 1992, at A3, (David Simonton, Esq., Supervisor of the Wyoming
Department of Employment's Labor Standards Division, reportedly viewed the language of the ADA
as vague and open to interpretation and was quoted as saying that "[wje're going to have a lot of

court cases and the courts are going tobe intricately involved with setting some of the standards").
18. 135 CONG. REC. 14,19801 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
19. Hearings on H.R. 2273 before the Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee

on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 201-12 (1989) (Attorney General
Dick Thornburgh testified that the ADA presented an historic opportunity parallel to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings before the Committee on Labor and
Human Resources and the Subcommittee on the Handicapped on S. 933, U.S. Senate, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 500 (1989) (Sally Douglas, testifying on behalf of the National Federation of Independent
Business that the ADA would prove more sweeping than the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
20. 135 CONG. REC. 14,19804 (1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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cal or mental disabilities. 2' Nationally, that figure translates into approximately one in every six people.22 In Wyoming, the Department of Employment has estimated that over 45,500 residents of the state are protected by the ADA, or about one out of every ten people. 23 Furthermore,
the law's coverage is expected to increase with time.
Congress recognized that the number of people with disabilities
would grow. 24 A contributing factor is the circumstance referred to as the
"graying of America": the fact that there are 30.4 million people in this
country who are at least 65 years of age, and that by 2030 that figure is
expected to grow to approximately 66 million.' In addition, the number
of people over 85 years old is increasing,26 and the incidence of disabilities becomes greater with age.27
The ADA does not guarantee equal results, establish quotas or require that preference be granted to people with disabilities. In a real
sense, however, it is an affirmative action law, not in the traditional sense
of the term, but in that compliance with the ADA is not to be passively
achieved. It is not enough to continue what may have traditionally been
considered as "nondiscriminatory" policies. Instead, specific, legally
enforceable responsibilities are created for both public and private parties
in order to help bring about a much greater level of participation by
people with disabilities within all facets of American society.'

21.

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(l) (Supp. 111 1991).

22. According to the 1990 United States Census we are a country of approximately 250 million
people.
23.

DWISION OF VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION, WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, REIRT

ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 1 (1991)

24. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (Supp. 1II 1991).
25.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & NATIONAL JUDICIAL COLLEGE, COURT-RELATED NEEDS OFTHE

ELDERLY AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE 70 (1991) (recommendations

of the Feb. 1991 Conference with the assistance of the Commission on Legal Problems of the
Elderly and the Commission on the Mentally Disabled).
26. Id.
27. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE, supra NOTE 7, at 4. For example, today close to half of the people

over 65 have some functional limitation in physical activity. The figure climbs to 55.3% for people
age 70-74 and to 72.5% for those over 75. COURT-RELATED NEEDS, supra note 25, at 70.
28. The National Council on Disability remarked that there is a lack of a clear distinction between nondiscrimination and affirmative action. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE app., supra note 10, at A2527. It noted the Supreme Court's attempt, in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S.

397, 410-13 (1979), a case decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, to draw a distinction between "evenhanded treatment of qualified handicapped persons and affirmative efforts to overcome
the disabilities caused by handicaps." The former, according to the Court, being nondiscrimination,
the latter, affirmative action. Six years later, the Court noted the haziness of the Davis opinion in
Alexander v. Choate, 496 U.S. 287, 300 n.20 (1985). To address the problem, the Council recommended the establishment of clear and enforceable equal opportunity standards, and explicit require-

ments for recruitment and outreach to increase participation by people with disabilities. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE, supra note 7, at A-27.
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The ADA addresses these responsibilities under three main titles.
Title I concerns employment discrimination.29 Title II deals with the services and practices of state and local governments, including the operations of their court systems." Title III places requirements on business
and is somewhat misleadingly termed the "public accommodations" section." Another part of the ADA deals with telecommunications. Its primary requirement is that broadcast public service announcements be closedcaptioned and that phone companies provide "non-voice" services to people with hearing and/or speaking disabilities.32 Finally, a catch-all section
of the law concerns miscellaneous topics such as enforcement, retaliation,
attorneys fees, insurance, and the ADA's relationship to other laws.33 As
will become apparent, these titles are filled with terms which have specific meanings. Gaining familiarity with these terms is key to understanding
the law.
B. The Meaning of "Individual with a Disability"
One of the more complex concepts of the ADA concerns who has a
"disability." 34 The law provides that there are three categories of protected individuals with disabilities. A person with a disability is one who has
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity, has a history of such an impairment, or is regarded as having
such an impairment. 35
The ADA itself provides no further definition of the terms used in
this three-category description. However, various federal agencies were
charged by Congress with implementing and enforcing the ADA,36 by,
among other things, promulgating rules and regulations to supplement the
law. Those rules and regulations provide additional definition to the terms
used in the ADA. 7

29.
30.
31.
32.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Supp. III1991).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (Supp. TIT1991).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (Supp. III 1991).
Title
IV of the ADA amends the Communications Act. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (Supp.

11 1990).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (Supp. 1111991).

rather than "handicap," and theterm "individual with a disability"
34. The term "disability"
instead of "individual with handicaps" is preferred. See 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.104 (1993).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. III 1991).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117, 12133 & 12188 (Supp. III1991).

37. Interpretive comments to various rules are provided in appendices and preambles which are
cited
throughout this
article.
Other assistance is provided by technical assistance manuals published by

aids is established by the
various implementing/enforcing agencies. The force of these interpretative
rule of law that a court will defer to an agency's interpretation in the face of ambiguity. See Chevron,

U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). This circumstance
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Some of the ADA's terms have different meanings depending upon
which title of the law is in issue, and therefore which agency's rules
apply. However, that is not the case with the term "disability," the definition of which was borrowed by all agencies from an earlier federal law:
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.38
Under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, an individual is protect39
ed from disability-based discrimination in certain circumstances if she
can prove that she is a "handicapped individual."' ° The Council on Disability emphasized that to people with disabilities who have spent years
stressing their abilities, achievements and independence, and objecting to
the label "handicapped," the need to prove that one is a handicapped
individual can be very difficult indeed." This problem, the report goes on
to point out, was addressed in part by the use of a broad, three-category
definition incorporated into Title V of the Rehabilitation Act.42 The federal agencies charged with ADA rule promulgation apparently agreed and
modeled their interpretation of "disability" after that of the Rehabilitation
Act.43 As a result, the precedent developed under the earlier law is
thought to have become generally applicable to ADA matters."
The first categorical definition pertains to people with "physical or
mental impairments" that "substantially limit" a "major life activity."45
According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter
referred to as the EEOC), physical or mental impairments include:
(i) any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory-including speech organs, cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and
endocrine; or,

was recognized during the debate on the ADA. See generally 135 CONG. REC. 14.19861 (1989) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988 & Supp. 1111991).
39. Unless the context suggests otherwise, the use of the feminine or masculine personal pronouns is arbitrary.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 706 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).

41.

See TOWARD INDEPENDENCE app., supra note 10, at A-22 to 25.

42. See supra note 40.
43. The agencies' approach is consistent with the tenet that the ADA not be construed as imposing lesser standards than those of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (Supp. III
1991).
44. E.g., supra note 16, at 1070.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (Supp. I111991).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol29/iss1/6
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(ii) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
specific learning disabilities.'
The Department of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the DOJ) rules
explicitly provide, that in addition to the two categories listed by the
EEOC, "physical or mental impairment" includes, but is not limited to:
[S]uch contagious and noncontagious diseases and conditions as
orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral
palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer,
heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness,
specific learning disabilities, HIV disease (whether symptomatic
or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug addiction and alcoholism.47
While under consideration, the proposed law was criticized in the
United States Senate for its failure to more specifically list the mental
impairments to be covered. 48 At least one Senator predicted that if the
ADA were enacted, the private sector would be swamped with mental
disability litigation. 9 By a successful amendment some uncertainty was
removed and the conditions which the Senator argued would have made
for the more egregious lawsuits were excepted from the definition of
disability." The excepted "conditions" are "homosexuality and bisexuality . . .transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeur-

46. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1993); for similar language concerning TitleII, see 28 C.F.R. §
35.104 (1993), and concerning Title III, see 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1993).
47. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1993) and 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1993); see also THE REPORT OF THE
SENATE COMMrTTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, quoted in part 135 CONG. REc. 15,20571 (1989).
EEOC provides the following further explanation of what impairments are intended to be covered:
The definition of the term 'impairment' does not include physical characteristics such as
eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight or muscle tone that are within
Inormal' range and are not the result of a physiological disorder. The definition, likewise,
does not include characteristic predisposition to illness or disease. Other conditions, such
as pregnancy, that are not the result of a physiological disorder are also not impairments.
Similarly, the definition does not include common personality traits such as poor judgment
or a quick temper where these are not symptoms of a mental or psychological disorder.
Environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages such as poverty, lack of education or a
prison record are not impairments. Advanced age, in and of itself, is not an impairment.
However, various medical conditions commonly associated with age, such as hearing loss,
osteoporosis, or arthritis would constitute impairments within the meaning of this part.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1993).
48. 135 CONG. REC. 14,19871 (1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong); 135 CONG. REC.
1,520,572 (1989).
49. 135 CONG. REC.14,19884 (1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
50. See supra note 48, at 20574.
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ism, gender identity disorders not resulting
from physical impairments,
51
and other sexual behavior disorders."
The rules give examples of the "major life activities" which must be
"substantially limited" by a mental or physical impairment for an individual to qualify as having a disability. These activities include the functions
of caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 52
Under the third prong of the definition, a major life activity is "substantially limited" if a person is:
(i) unable to perform the major life activities that the average
person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) significantly restricted - as to condition, manner or duration in the manner in which the individual can perform a major life
activity, relative to the average person in the general population.
In addition, the following factors are to be considered in determining
whether an individual is substantially limited:
(i) the nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and,
(iii) the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment. 3
The second category of protected individuals with a disability includes those who have a history of a mental or physical impairment which
substantially limits a major life activity. As might be expected, the rules
refer to a person with a history of such an impairment. Perhaps surprisingly, they go on to provide that those who
have been misclassified as
54
having such impairments are also protected.
The third category of individual with a disability-"one who is
regarded as having such an impairment"-requires a bit more explanation.

51.

42 U.S.C. § 12211 (Supp. III 1991).

52.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1993).

53. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1993); concerning Title II, see 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.104 (1993);
concerning Title HI, see 28 C.F.R. app. B § 36.104 (1993). It should be noted that the existence of

an impairment is to be determined without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, and
assistive or prosthetic devices. Regarding Title I, see 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1993).
54. Regarding Title I, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1993); regarding Title II, see 28 C.F.R. §
35.104 (1991); and regarding Title III, see 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1993). An example of a person who
has been misclassified as having an impairment is one who is mistakenly thought to have been mentally retarded or ill. 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.104 (1993).
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The rationale for this category of individual with a disability was articulated by the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline." In Arline, a schoolteacher was fired because her employer feared
that her tuberculosis was contagious. 6 In doing so, however, the defendant argued that the protections and requirements of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 did not apply since it was acting, not because of Ms. Arline's
impairment, but out of concern for the health of others. 7 The Court
disagreed, and in interpreting the Rehabilitation Act referred to "society's
accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases" and held that
they "are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from
actual impairment." 58 The ADA rules adopt that viewpoint and provide
that a person is "regarded as having such an impairment":
(i) even if the individual has no impairment but is treated by a
covered entity as if he did;
(ii) if the individual has such an impairment only as a result of the
attitudes of others toward such impairment; or,
(iii) if the individual has no such impairment but is treated by a
covered entity as if she did.59
According to the EEOC, an example of a person satisfying the first
part of this category would be one with controlled high blood pressure
which is not "substantially limiting." If the person's employer were to
reassign the individual to less strenuous work because of a fear that the
person might suffer a heart attack, the employer would be regarding the
individual as disabled.' As an example of someone contemplated by the
second part of this category, the EEOC refers to an individual with a
prominent facial scar or a periodic involuntary jerk of the head which
does not limit a major life activity. If the person's employer discriminates
against the person because of the condition, for example because of negative customer reaction, the employer would be regarding the individual as
disabled.61 Finally, the agency cites, as an example of a person protected
under the third part of this category, the case of an individual erroneously

55. 480 U.S. 273 (1987), reh. den. 481 U.S. 1024 (1987).
56. Id.at276.
57. Id.at 281.

58. Id.at 284. The case was remanded forfurther findings as to whether the risk of infection
precluded the plaintiff from being "otherwise qualified" for her job and, if so, whether reasonable
accommodations were possible. Id. at 277.
59. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (1993); regarding Title II, see 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1993); and
regarding Title III see 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1993).
60. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(1) (1993).
61. Id.
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believed by an employer to be infected with HIV. The protections of the
ADA would be invoked if the62employer discriminates against the person
based on the erroneous belief.
Ill.

TITLE I-EMPLOYMENT

Title I of the ADA prohibits disability-based employment discrimination by "covered entities." 63 Generally, the rule is that an employer
must select the most qualified person for a job without regard to the
disability. An important caveat, however, is that, except in some special
circumstances which are described below, should a person with a disability require assistance-in the words of the law a "reasonable accommodation"-an employer, or prospective employer, with knowledge of the need
is obligated to provide it.' Congress charged the EEOC with implementing and enforcing Title I and instructed the agency to promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations.65
Under Title I, "a qualified individual with a disability" is protected
in every phase of employment. Therefore, all terms, conditions and privileges of work including hiring, advancement, discharge, and the provision
of benefits, are regulated.' This protection exists in both the public and
private workplace.67
"Covered entities" which are subject to the prohibition against discrimination include employers, employment agencies, labor organizations
and joint labor-management committees. 68 These definitions, as well as
several others used in the Title I rules, are identical, or almost identical,
to terms found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.69 According
to the EEOC, they are to have the same meaning under the ADA as they
have under the Civil Rights Act.7'

62. Id.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. 1111991).
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8)-(9) & 12112(a) (Supp. III 1991).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (Supp. 1111991). See 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 (1993) (the rules, regulations, and explanatory appendix); 56 Fed. Reg. 35734 (1991) (the preamble, which does not appear in
29 C.F.R. Part 1630); the EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL; and the joint EEOC - DOJ ADA

HANDBOOK are chief sources of information concerning Title I.
66. 42 U.S.C. §12112(a) (Supp. 1111991).
67. Some federal employees and Presidential appointees were brought within the ADA's coverage by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. CR.A. of 1991 §§ 301-325 (1991).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (Supp. III 1991).
69. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630(a)-(f) (1993). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 appears at42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1988 & Supp. 1111991).
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(c) (1993).
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A private employer, and any agent of the employer, is subject to the
Title I provisions if the employer is engaged in an industry affecting
commerce and employs, or has employed, 15 or more people during each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year.7" Excluded from coverage are private membership clubs-other than labor organizations-if such clubs are tax exempt
under § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.72
Employment protections extend to "qualified" individuals with disabilities. In the employment context, qualified means one who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the "essential functions"
of the job.73
An essential function of a job is to be distinguished from one which
is "marginal." 74 The EEOC description of an essential function is not
very helpful. It describes it as a duty which is fundamental because, for
example, the position exists to perform the task; within the employer's
work force there is only a limited number of employees available to
perform the function; or, the task is so highly specialized that people are
hired specifically because of their ability to perform it.75
A person with a disability has the burden of informing an employer,
or prospective employer, of the need for assistance in performing the
essential functions of the job. Furthermore, in the case of a prospective
employee, he or she is required to inform the employer that assistance is
required in conjunction with the hiring process.76 This burden is consistent with the ADA tenet that an employer may not make any medical
inquiry prior to the offer of employment.'
When an employer is on notice that accommodation is needed, a
case-by-case, interactive process is contemplated to determine what as-

71. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1211(5)(B)(ii) (Supp. III 1991). The Internal Revenue Code grants tax exempt
status to private, non-profit organizations under certain conditions. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
73. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. III 1991).
74. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1993).
75. Id. In the roles, the EEOC lists the following as examples of the evidence that an employer
might use to demonstrate that a function is essential: an employer's opinion, see 42 U.S.C. §
12111(8) (Supp. III 1991); a written description of functions which was prepared before interviews or
advertisement of the job (note, the ADA does not require job descriptions, however, because a job
description may support an employer's claim that a function is essential, thorough descriptions may
be advisable), see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. III 1991); the amount of time to be spent performing
the function; the consequences of not requiring the performance of the function; the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; the work experience of past incumbants; and/or the current work experience of incumbants in similar jobs.
76. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.11 (1993).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (Supp. 11 1991); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13 (1993).
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sistance is required. The EEOC suggests that first an employer determine
the essential functions of the job, assuming that this was not done in
advance of taking applications for the position in question.7 8 Next, the
employer is to communicate with the person in need of accommodation to
determine his or her job-related limitations and how they might be overcome.79 Finally, in consultation with the person-and, if necessary, by
consulting with outside technical assistance-an employer is to analyze
potential accommodations, giving primary consideration to the preferences
expressed by the person in need of assistance.A°
An employer's obligation to provide accommodation is not without
limits. First, it does not extend to adjustments or modifications which are
primarily for the personal benefit of an individual with a disability.8 In
other words, if a measure is not only job-related, but is instead one which
assists the person throughout his or her daily activities, both on and off
considered a personal item and the employer is not required
the job, it is 82
it.
provide
to
In addition, an employer is only required to provide "reasonable"
accommodations. An accommodation which imposes an "undue hardship"
on an employer is not reasonable. 83 This limitation is intended to take into
consideration the financial abilities of the employer, as well as whether

or
the accommodation under consideration would be unduly disruptive
4
"fundamentally alter" the nature of the employer's business.
A. Pre-hire Inquiries
As stated, the ADA's employment protections are first imposed at

the pre-hire stage and apply to all employment decisions. 85 To begin with,
a covered entity may not use qualification standards, tests or selection

78. Job descriptions are not required by the ADA, but are generally advisable.
79, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1993).
80. Id. The EEOC describes the requirement that a proposed accommodation be linked to an
essential function with the following example: suppose an individual has a vision impairment which

restricts his or her field of vision. Suppose further that reading is an essential function of the job in
question. The person would not be required to accept an accommodation, such as a reader, to be
considcred qualified. If on the other hand, the person in the example were not able to read unaided,

refusing a reasonable accommodation would render him or her unqualified. 29 C.F.R. app. §
1630.9(d) (1993). It should also be noted that an individual with a disability is not required to accept
an accommodation offered by an employer. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(d) (1993).
81. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1993).
82. Id. For example, according to the EEOC interpretive appendix, an employer would not be
required to provide items such as prosthetic limbs, wheelchairs, and eyeglasses.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991).

84. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2 (1993).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
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criteria that tend to screen out people with disabilities on the basis of their
disabilities, unless the method or criterion is shown to be job-related and
consistent with business necessity. 6 Next, if an applicant requires an
accommodation to interview or compete for a position, and if it is reasonable, the employer must provide it. 7 The objective is to prevent qualified
applicants from being excluded from consideration merely because they
have a disability which has no connection with their ability to perform the
essential functions of the job.8 8 Possibly in anticipation of reverse discrimination charges which may challenge pre-employment assistance provided
to people with disabilities, the EEOC announced that it will view reasonable accommodations as a form of non-discrimination. 9
Recently, a U.S. District Court in New York provided some insight
into these provisions.' Even though the case was not decided under the
employment title of the ADA, it offers some evidentiary advice to employers, an interpretation of "reasonable accommodation," and a reaction
to unfair advantage concerns. In the case, Ms. D'Amico, a law school
graduate and applicant for admission to the New York Bar, sued for an
injunction compelling the State Board of Law Examiners to provide requested accommodations in conjunction with the bar examination. 9' She
had a vision related disability which made reading extremely difficult, and
which the examiners agreed entitled her to reasonable accommodations."
Taking the exam in the summer of 1992, she was allowed six and onehalf extra hours to take the two day test, supplied with a large print exam, and afforded other minor accommodations. 93 Unsuccessful in this at-

tempt, she applied to take the exam again in February 1993, and asked
for additional accommodations, including permission to take the test over
four days." The examiners refused to extend the test schedule, citing
security and a concern that allowing the requested additional time would
give D'Amico an unfair advantage. 95 The court viewed the case principal-

86. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10 (1993).
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A)
1630.11 (1993).

& 12189 (Supp. III 1991); see also 29 C.F.R. app.

§

88. In other words, a person may not be screened out merely because a disability prevents the
taking of a test or negatively influences the results of the test. See 29 C.F.R. app. §§ 1630.1, .11

(1993).
89. "The obligation to make reasonable accommodation is a form of non-discrimination." 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1993).
90. D'Amico v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 813 F. Supp. 217, (W.D.N.Y.

1993).
91.
92.
93.

Id.at 219.
Id.at 218.
Id.

94. Id. at 219.
95.

Id.at 221.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1994

15

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 29 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 6
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXIX

ly as a medical issue and relied on the opinion of the applicant's physician
because the defendant board presented no conflicting medical evidence,
arguing instead that D'Amico's doctor was not qualified to recommend an
extended test schedule. 96 It granted an injunction allowing the requested
four-day schedule. 97 The court observed that, while attending physicians

do not have the final word on determining what is reasonable, where
there is no conflicting evidence and the doctor's opinion does not appear
outrageous, it is entitled to great weight.98 The significance of this case is
that it confirms that an employer which is considering refusing an accommodation would be well advised to consider obtaining the support of a
medical expert.
Intense debate took place in Congress over what inquiry employers
should be allowed to make of job applicants." Should, for example, an
employer be able to ask an applicant for a teaching position whether he or
she has a communicable disease? Should a committee of citizens charged
with screening applicants for an appointment to the judiciary be able to
ask about past health or alcohol abuse? Again, the ADA draws on the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.'1° The regulations make a sharp distinction
between what questions are permissible before and after a job is offered.10 1
At the pre-offer stage, a prospective employer, or its agent, may
inquire as to an applicant's ability to perform job-related functions and
ask an applicant to describe or to demonstrate how, with or without reasonable accommodation, she will be able to perform them.l12 An employer may, in appropriate circumstances, ask an individual with a known disability to describe or demonstrate job performance. 3 However, unless a
known disability will interfere with the applicant's performance of a jobrelated function, the employer may only request a description or demonstration of performance if the same request is made of all applicants."
Before making a conditional offer of employment, it is unlawful to
conduct a medical examination of an applicant or to ask whether the
applicant is an individual with a disability, about the nature or severity of
such disability,0 5 or for a medical history.'0 6 Consequently, questions
96. Id. at 222-23.
97. Id. at 223-24.
98. Id. at 223.

99. E.g., 135 CONG. REC. 14,19865-67 (1989) (exchange between Senators Helms and Harkin).
100. 29 C.F.R. app. §1613.10,13-14 (1993).
101. Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. §12112(d) (Supp. III 1991); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (1993).

103. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.14(a) (1993).
104. Id.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1990); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(a) (1993).
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must be narrowly tailored" 7 and should not be phrased in terms of dis08
ability.
B. Post-offer Inquiries
After making an offer of employment, an employer may require that
all entering employees in the same job category submit to a medical examination."9 Somewhat confusingly, the rules provide that, although the
post-offer examination can be broad, any criteria which are used to screen
out a prospective employee with a disability must be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and relate to essential functions of the job
which cannot be performed with reasonable accommodation."10 Information obtained in the course of performing a post-offer inquiry or examination is confidential, must be segregated from other personnel files, and
may only be used for specified purposes."'
C. Direct Threat

An individual with a disability need not be allowed to pose a "direct
threat" to the health or safety of himself or others." 2 Again, an individualized assessment is expected to be conducted by the employer."' The
rules require that a candidate's present ability to safely perform the essen-

tial functions of the job be analyzed, and that decisions are to be based on

106. EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 5.1.

107. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.14(a) (1993).
108. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.13(a) (1993). The EEOC also provides the following among its
examples of inquiries which may not be included on application forms or in job interviews:
list any conditions or diseases for which you have been treated in the past 3 years; have
you ever been hospitalized; have you ever been treated by a psychiatrist or psychologist;
have you ever been treated for any mental condition; have you had a major illness in the
last 5 years; are you taking any prescribed drugs; have you ever been treated for drug
addiction or alcoholism; do you have any disabilities or impairments which may affect
your performance, or is there any health-related reason you may not be able to perform the
job for which you are applying.
See EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, § 5.5(b). Suggestions of specific questions which may and
may not be asked are available. E.g., Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Employers' Screening Procedures Under
the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: What's Legal? What's Illegal? What's Debatable?, C780 ALIABA 291 (June 3,1993).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (Supp. III 1991); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (1993).
110. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (1993).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (Supp. 1111991); see also 29 C.F.R. 1630.14(c) (1993).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (Supp. 1111991); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (1993). A direct threat is a significant risk to the health or safety of the protected individual or others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (Supp. III 1991); see also
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1993).
113. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1991).
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reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical
knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence." 4
The EEOC cautions that subjective perceptions, irrational fears,
patronizing attitudes, or stereotypes about the nature or effect of a particular disability, or disability in general, will not support the defense of
direct threat. It cites, as an example, a law firm and observes that the
firm could not reject an applicant with a history of disabling mental illness based upon a generalized fear that the stress of trying to make partner might trigger a relapse of the lawyer's mental illness." 5
D. Remedies
The remedies available under Title I are those set forth in various
sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"6 as amended by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.1"7 They include injunction (e.g., hiring or reinstatement, with or without back pay), compensatory damages (e.g., for future
pecuniary loss, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish
and loss of enjoyment of life), and punitive damages-from private employers-if the employer has engaged in a discriminatory practice with
"malice or reckless indifference" to an individual's rights."'
A reading of Title I and its enforcement mechanism," 9 in isolation,
could lead to the conclusion that all individuals with ADA employment
complaints must pursue their rights through the EEOC, as the administrative agency charged with enforcing the Title, before resorting to the
courts. That would be consistent with the well-known concept of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 20° However, the requirement may not
exist for public employment claimants. The Department of Justice has
interpreted the program-activity-services provisions of Title II of the ADA
as incorporating the employment protections of Title 1.121 In addition, the
DOJ has made it clear that people complaining against state and local

114. Id. In examining a potential threat, the following factors are also to be considered: the
duration of the risk; the nature and severity of the potential harm; the likelihood that the potential

harm will occur; and the imminence of the potential harm. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1993).
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

29
42
42
Id.
42

C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (1993).
U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. Itt 1991).
U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. 111 1991).
U.S.C, § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988).

120. The doctrine requires that where a potential administrative remedy exists it must be pursued before a claimant resorts to court. See generally 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law §§ 595-609

(1962).
121.

28C.F.R. §35.140 (1993).
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governments need not exhaust their administrative remedies. 22 As a result, it seems that exhaustion may not be required when an employment
discrimination charge is made against a public employer.' 23
E. Wyoming Fair Employment PracticesAct
The ADA is not intended to invalidate or limit the rights or remedies
of other federal, state or local laws, so long as they provide greater or
equal protection to that provided by the ADA.124 Wyoming has afforded
people with disabilities protection from discrimination in employment
since 1985." 2 The pertinent provision of the law reads:
(a) It is a discriminatory or unfair employment practice:
(i) For an employer to refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote, or to discriminate in matters of compensation or the terms conditions or privileges of employment
against, a qualified handicapped person...
(ii) For a person, an employment agency, a labor organization, or the employees or members thereof, to discriminate
in matters of employment or membership against.., a
qualified handicapped person...

(d) As used in this section 'qualified handicapped person' means a
handicapped person who is capable of performing a particular job,
or who would be capable of performing a particular job with rea26
sonable accommodation to his handicap.1
This state law has not been widely used. 27 Recently, however, an individual successfully alleged a violation of the section against his former employer.' 2

122. DOJ TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, 11-9, 1000.
123. At least one federal district court has agreed. See Peterson v, University of Wisconsin Bd.

of Regents, No. 93-C-46-C, (W.D. Wis. Apr. 20, 1993).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (Supp. I1 1991).
125. Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act, ch. 5, § 1 (1985) (codified as amended at WYO.
STAT. § 27-9-105(b) (1991)).

126. WYo. STAT. § 27-9-105 (1991).
127. As of April 28, 1992, only three disability cases had gone to public hearing within the last
three years. All other cases were either dismissed, settled or denied a public hearing for failure to

present additional evidence or show misapplication of the law. Letter from David Simonton, Supervisor Labor Standards Division, Wyoming Department of Employment (Apr. 28, 1992) (on file with
author).
128.

World Mart, Inc. v. Ditsch, 855 P.2d 1228 (Wyo. 1993).
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James Ditsch, described by the Court as a "quadriplegic confined to
a wheelchair," was employed as a telemarketer, and subsequently as a
supervisor for a private, for-profit company selling light bulbs. 2 9 When
the branch manager decided to relocate, Ditsch applied for the vacancy. 30
Another person, a woman with a history of alcohol abuse, was apparently
the only applicant interviewed and she was subsequently placed in the
position instead of Ditsch.' 3 l After her appointment, she removed Ditsch
from his supervisory position, and when he refused reassignment, terminated his employment with the company."3 In his complaint, Ditsch alleged that he was the most qualified applicant for the branch manager
position and that he was impermissibly passed over.'33
As is required by the Act,' 34 the charge of illegal discrimination was
135
investigated by the Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Commission,
which, after conducting a fact-finding hearing, found reasonable cause to
believe that discrimination had occurred and proposed a settlement."3 The
parties rejected the Commission's settlement proposal and a contested case
was conducted pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedures
Act. 137
Interestingly, the employer contended that because the person selected for the position was also "handicapped," Ditsch could not sustain his
burden of proof."'3 The hearing officer for the Commission found that the
new branch manager was a practicing, rather than a recovered alcoholic,
and for that reason rejected the employer's claim. 39 The examiner also
held that the employer had not established by a preponderance of the
evidence that Ditsch was denied the position or terminated for legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons."4 In making this ruling, the examiner apparently adopted the argument presented on behalf of Ditsch that the branch
manager was not a handicapped person under the definition in the
Commission's Rules, which is substantively identical to that in the
ADA. 141
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 1231.
Id.
Id.

132. Id.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 1231.
See Wyo. STAT. § 27-9-104 (1991).
World Mart, Inc., 855 P.2d at 1231.

136. Id.
137.
16-3-115
138.
139.
140.

Id. The Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act is found at WYO. STAT. §§ 16-3-101 to
(1990 & Supp. 1993).
World Mart, Inc., 855 P.2d at 1233.
Id.
Id.

141.

"(a) 'Handicapped person' means any person who has a physical or mental impairment
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The Wyoming Supreme Court avoided the issue of whether alcoholism constitutes a disability under state law, holding that whether the
new manager was "handicapped," either as a recovering or practicing
alcoholic, was not controlling. 42 Instead, it held that in either event, once
a prima facie showing of discrimination was shown by Ditsch-and the
Court held that there was substantial evidence in the record to support
that conclusion-the burden shifted to the employer to establish that the
new branch manager was more qualified. 4 3 Since the employer did not
carry its burden, the administrative decision was sustained. '"
IV. TITLE I1-STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES, PRACTICES
A. Transportation

AND ACTIVITIES

According to a key Senate sponsor of the ADA, transportation is the
linchpin which enables people with disabilities to be integrated and
mainstreamed into society. 45 It is the key to opening up education, employment, and recreation, thus the other provisions of the ADA are meaningless unless there is an accessible public transportation system."
Title II of the ADA consists of two subtitles. Subtitle B concerns
public transportation, other than aircraft and certain rail operations, and
the facilities associated with transportation. 47 Disability-based discrimination in connection with the provision of transportation is forbidden."
Discriminatory actions such as segregation, the imposition of special

which substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such impairment, or is
regarded as having such an impairment." Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the Wyoming Fair
Employment Commission Concerning Handicap Discrimination Complaints Filed Pursuant to the Fair
Employment Practice Act of 1965 as Amended, Ch. X, § 3 (Jan. 14, 1986). Compare 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2) (Supp. III 1991) (the ADA definition).
142. World Mart, Inc., 855 P.2d at 1233.'
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1235. In addition to awarding back pay with interest against World Mart, Inc., the
order for relief required the defendant to cease its discriminatory practices, and to implement an
affirmative action program which would offer equal employment opportunities "to all persons regardless of handicap or disability." Id. at 1232. On appeal, the employer argued that this portion of the
order was an abuse of discretion. The Court disagreed, holding that it was undisputed that the employer only hired handicapped individuals for telemarketer positions. In responding to this "reverse
discrimination" allegation the Court held that the statute in question, WYO. STAT. § 27-9-106(g)
(1991), was sufficiently broad to justify the order, and that the Commission had not abused its discretion. World Mart, Inc., 855 P.2d at 1238.
145. 135 CONG. REC. 14,19802 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
146. Id.
147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12165 (Supp. III 1991).
148. 49 C.F.R. § 37.5(a) (1993).
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charges, and requirements for users to be accompanied by an attendant
are all addressed, as are standards for vehicle and facility accessibility.' 49
The Department of Transportation is responsible for enforcing compliance with this section by public entities which receive federal assistance.' The DOJ is charged with watching over the transportation activities of other public entities and of all private transportation providers.'
B. Other Services, Practices and Activities of State and Local Governments
Subtitle A of Title II is applicable to state and local government.15 2 It
may be seen as a rough blend of the employment provisions of Title I and
the facilities-services-goods accessibility concepts of Title III which relate
to public accommodations. 153 Implementation and enforcement of the
Subtitle are the responsibility of the DOJ. 54 Accordingly, it has promulgated pertinent rules and regulations.' 55
The entities covered by Subtitle A include all levels and instrumentalities of state and local government, 6 as well as their contractors. ' In
recognition of the Supreme Court's decision in Atascadero State Hospital
v. Scanlon,'58 Congress attempted to ensure that there was no question
that a claim of immunity would be available to a state pursuant to the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution.t59
The title protects qualified individuals with disabilities in relation to
all services, programs and activities of state and local government. "
Essentially, everything that these public entities do or are involved with is
addressed, and in at least one area there is double coverage. 6'

149. 49 C.F.R. §§ 37.5-37.9 (1992).
150. 49 C.F.R. § 37.11(a) (1992).

151. 49 C.F.R. § 37.11(b)-(c) (1992).
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (Supp. III 1991).

153. See infra notes 247-289 and accompanying text
154. 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (Supp. II1 1991).

155. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 (1993). These rules along with an interpretative appendix, 28 C.F.R. pt.
35 app., Technical Assistance Manual, and ADA Handbook, issued jointly between the DOJ and the
EEOC, are chief sources of information about the subtitle.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (Supp. 1111991).
157. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (1993).
158. 473 U.S. 234 (1985). In Atascadero, a case brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits for monetary damages against states, with
the majority holding that Congress can abrogate state immunity from federal suit "only by making its
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Id. at 242.
159. 28 C.F.R. § 35.178 (1993).
160. 42 U.S.C § 12132 (Supp. III 1991).

161. Employment practices are covered by both Titles I and II. See 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.140
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Initially, the DOJ proposed utilizing the definition of "employer"
found in the EEOC Title I rules and regulations, which would have exempted public entities with fewer than 15 employees, like private sector
employers of that size."' In the final analysis, however, the DOJ was
persuaded by Congress' intent to have the employment practices of all
public entities regulated, 163 and the final rules reflect that conclusion." 6
The effective date for full compliance by all state and local government
employers, regardless of number of employees, was January 26, 1992.16'
1. Program Accessibility
The thought that programs should be made accessible to people with
disabilities was established in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504 regulations which were adopted by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare for use in the federally-assisted programs it supervised. 6 6 Under
the regulations, recipients of federal assistance were allowed to make their
federally-assisted programs and activities available to individuals with disabilities by modifying the programs and activities, when possible, rather
than making physical alterations to facilities. This approach proved to be
workable 67 and was incorporated into the ADA rules with respect to existing facilities.'68 As a result, each service, program and activity of a
public entity, when viewed in its entirety, must be readily accessible to
and usable by people with disabilities.' 69
To accomplish that end, the rules require all public entities to evaluate their policies and practices to identify those which are not consistent
with this objective. 70 The evaluation process must include an opportunity
for interested people to participate by submitting comments.'' Entities
employing more than 49 people are required to maintain and allow public

(1993). Overlapping jurisdiction was a matter of concern to Congress. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (Supp.
III 1991). Accordingly, federal agencies have pledged to work with each other to develop coordinated enforcement. 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 (1993). Currently however, both the EEOC and the DOJ are
sources for employment-based complaint resolution, at least with respect to state and local government.
162. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Implementing Subtitle A of Title II of the ADA, 56
Fed. Reg. 8538 (1991).
163. 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.140 (1993).
164. 28 C.F.R § 35,140 (1993).
165. 28 C.F.R § 35.140 (1993).
166. E.g., 28 C.F.R. pt.39 (1993).
167. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, subpart D, app. (1993).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) (Supp. I1 1991).
169. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (1993).
170. 28 C.F.R. § 35.105(a) (1993).

171. 28 C.F.R. § 35.105(b) (1993).
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inspection of their self-evaluation study for three years. 72 Such entities
are also required to have a transition plan describing how and when they
will come into compliance if structural modifications' are necessary.' 74
Structural modifications required for program accessibility are to
be completed as soon as possible but in no event later than January 26,
1995.' Non-structural changes are to be made immediately. 76 New
construction and alterations to public facilities are to be made so that
the final product is readily accessible, which generally means that one
of two accessibility standards must be met. Either the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG),' 77 or the Uniform Federal Accessibility
Standards (UFAS)' 78 may be followed by a public entity."
An entity is not required to take action which would threaten the
historical significance of a property."8 It also need not take an action
which it can demonstrate would fundamentally alter a service, program
or activity, or result in an undue financial or administrative burden.t"
Fitting a facility or activity into this exemption is not easily
achieved. " A public entity's decision to claim the exemption must be
made by its head or his or her designee, after considering all resources
available to the entity for use in the funding and operation of the service, program, or activity.'83 In addition, the claim must be accompanied by a written statement of reasons supporting the conclusion."
Contrasted with the requirement of Title III that private entities
remove architectural barriers where "readily achievable," t" Title II
172. 28 C.F.R. § 35.105(c) (1993).
173. "Structural" changes in this context include all physical changes to a facility. 28 C.F.R.
app. § 35.150 (1993).
174. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(d) (1993).
175. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(c) (1993).
176. 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.150 (1993).
177. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. A (1993).
178. The Architectural Barriers Act of 1968 and its amendments required that buildings and
facilities constructed or altered by the federal government or with federal funds be free of physical
barriers. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4156 (1988). The General Services Administration (GSA), which oversees federal courthouses, along with other agencies performing similar functions, were directed to
develop accessibility standards for properties under their supervision. As a consequence, the UFAS
guidelines were developed. Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards, 41 C.F.R. pt. 1190 app. A
(1993).
179. 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(c) (1993).
180. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(2) (1993).
181. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (1993).
182. The DOJ has stated that in its opinion compliance with the section would not result in
undue financial and administrative burdens in most cases. 28 C.F.R. app. §35.150 (1993).
183. 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(c) (1993).
184. Id.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (Supp. III 1991).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol29/iss1/6

24

Mullen: The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Introduction for Lawyers
1993

THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

does not require a public entity to make each of its existing facilities
accessible."S But, there are three caveats to keep in mind when deciding whether and how to provide program accessibility. First, Congress
intended that the "undue burden" exemption, which allows noncompliance with Title II,187 should require significantly more of a public
entity than the "non-readily achievable" exemption which allows noncompliance with Title III by a private party. 8
The second caveat concerns the finding expressed in the ADA
that individuals with disabilities have been segregated to their detriment and to the detriment of the rest of the nation: "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities,
and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive
social problem. "I"9 Consistent with this finding, the regulations contain
repeated cautions against methods of providing program accessibility
which result in segregation.'9°
The final caveat concerning how to make programs accessible is
the suggestion that those affected should be consulted. Public entities
are encouraged to involve people with disabilities in the self-evaluation/transition planning process beyond soliciting comments. 19' People
with disabilities should be a ready source of help in identifying program and facility accessibility deficiencies and suggesting methods of
resolving them. Such individuals would also seem to be the most likely
source of complainants/plaintiffs in enforcement actions. If they are
made allies by being given a real opportunity to be community resources, they may thereby be encouraged to choose less adversarial,
more local methods of expressing their needs and desires." 9

186. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(1) (1993).
187.

28 C.F.R.

§ 35.151(c)

188. 28 C.F.R. app.

(1993).

§ 35.150

(1993).

189. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (Supp. 1I

1991). See also supra note 10, at C-I to 31; 135

CONG. REC. 14,19802-3 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin); 135 CONG. REC. 14,19808 (1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
190. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(2), 35.130(d) (1993).
191.

Public entities that employ more than 49 people are required to provide opportunity for

public participation in the self-evaluation process. 28 C.F.R. § 35.105(b) (1993).
192. 28 C.F.R. app.

§§

35.105 & 35.106 (1993). Beyond the planning stage, entities with more

than 49 employees are required to establish a grievance process and to name an ADA coordinator
which is another attempt to encourage local resolution of complaints. See 28 C.F.R. §35.107 (1991).
Local governments employing fewer than 49 people are not required to establish a grievance process
or designate a responsible employee because, in the judgment of the DOJ, paperwork burdens on
small communities should be minimized. 28 C.F.R. app. §§ 35.105 & 35.107 (1993). Nevertheless, it

seems that they could benefit from voluntarily adopting these measures.
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2. Qualified Individuals with Disabilities
The prohibition of Title II, subtitle A is directed toward discrimination by public entities against "qualified" people with disabilities.'93
Neither the ADA nor the DOJ does a good job of explaining who is
qualified."9 According to the DOJ, a person is qualified if he or she
meets the essential eligibility requirements, with or without reasonable
modifications to the rules, policies, or practices of the public entity,
the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services."
Even the concept of "qualification" has been criticized. The
§ 504 regulations of the Rehabilitation Act refer to handicapped individuals who are otherwise qualified.' 96 The provision was described in
TOWARD INDEPENDENCE as redundant and illogical, the argument being
that a person who is denied benefit because he or she does not possess
the requisite qualifications has not been discriminated against on the
basis of disability."9 Arguably, a similar conclusion was reached by
the United States Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate, 98 where the
Court noted that "the question of who is 'otherwise qualified' and
what actions constitute 'discrimination' under . . . [s]ection [504 of the
Rehabilitation Act] would seem to be two sides of a single coin."'
Congress was not persuaded however, and the term persists. Here
again, focusing on the underlying objective-that admission to a service, program or activity should not be dependent upon the absence of
disabilities-may be helpful to an understanding of who is qualified.'
The DOJ provides as an example of one who is qualified, a person
desiring information which is routinely provided by a public entity
about its services. To be eligible to receive the information, a person
need only ask. The ability to ask by voice telephone would not normally be "essential." Accordingly, an entity should provide an alternative,
193. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. 1111991). Public transportation programs covered under Subtitle
B are excluded. 28 C.F.R. § 35.102 (1993).
194. See e.g., 42 U.S.C § 12131(2) (Supp, III 1991); 28 C.F.R § 35.104 (1993). Presumably,
for further clarification the DOJ will look to interpretations developed under the Department of Health
and Human Services' regulations, 45 C.F.R § 84.3(k) (1992), which implemented section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 , since the DO took its definition of "qualified individual with a disability" from that source. 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.104 (1993).
195. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1993).
196. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1992).
197. See TOWARD INDEPENDENCE app., supra note 10, at A-19.
198. 469 U.S. 292 (1985).
199. Id. at 299 n.19.
200. E.g., 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.102 (1993).
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equally accessible format for people with disabilities to gain access to
the information." 1 In other instances, according to the DOJ, eligibility
requirements may need to be more stringent. For example, they cite to
a medical school which may require that people who are admitted to it
must first complete a specified undergraduate course of study. The
undergraduate program would be an essential requirement for both
those with and without disabilities, and one not completing it would be
unqualified to attend medical school. 2"
An entity may also consider as unqualified a person who poses a
direct threat to the health or safety of others, which cannot be eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level by a modification of an entity's
policies, practices, or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids
or services. 3 This is subtly different from the direct threat concept in
employment under Title I. An employer may consider a person to be
unqualified if she poses a threat to the health or safety of herself or to
others. Like the process under Title I however, reaching the conclusion that a person poses a direct threat under Title II must be based on
an individualized assessment. Such an assessment, to withstand scrutiny, must rely on current medical evidence or on the best available
objective information; a review of the nature, duration and severity of
the risk posed; the probability that injury will occur; and, whether reasonable modifications would reduce or eliminate the risk. 2'
3. Accessibility and the Judicial Process
In addition to the requirements of Title II, that state and local
government programs and facilities be accessible, there is also an
obligation that communication with these entities be made easier. 2 5
These communication accessibility requirements should be of special
interest to government officials responsible for overseeing legislative,
regulatory and judicial activities.
The ADA's requirements, as they specifically relate to state and
local courts, have not received wide attention, and the unique features
and activities of such facilities have in large measure not yet been
addressed. Only minimal guidance for court administrators is available
now, 2 6 but more is expected in the near future.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1993); see also D.O.J. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL at 11-2.8000.
D.O.J. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL at 11-2.8000.
28 C.F.R. app. § 35.104 (1993); D.O.J. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL at 11-2.8000.
28 C.F.R. app. § 35.104 (1993); D.O.J. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL at 11-2.8000.
28 C.F.R §§ 35.160-.164 (1993).
UFAS, supra note 178, contain general directives, which are not specifically directed to
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Because laws affecting state and local courthouse accessibility are
not uniform, the DOJ has proposed detailed standards which will
amend ADAAG. 2 7 These new provisions are intended to apply to all
state and local facilities, including courts. 2
Apart from facility accessibility, courts and other state and local
government facilities must make appropriate auxiliary aids and services available in order to provide equal communication access to individuals with disabilities.' ° The first task to be undertaken relative to
communication accessibility is to provide an opportunity for people
with disabilities to request auxiliary aids and services. 1 Accordingly,
"'
appropriate notice must be given.21
In selecting among various types of communication assistance, an
entity must give primary consideration to the expressed preference of
the individuals seeking accommodation. The person's choice must be
granted unless a governmental entity can demonstrate that another
equally effective means of communication is available, or that the use
of the preferred means would result in a fundamental alteration in the

activity or an undue financial or administrative burden. 213 The same
decision-making process described above concerning facility accessibility is required to support an entity's decision."1 4

judicial facilities. However, they do classify the public areas of courtrooms as an "assembly occupancy," which means that they must have certain accessible features for people with disabilities who can
be expected to either visit or work in them. 41 C.F.R pt. 1190 app. A § 4.1.4(4) (1993). A revised
design guide was distributed to federal court facilities in September of 1991. SPACE AND FACILITIES
UNInE STAinS
cE1(F TE U"f Eh STATESAl
ITAT[VE OCEOF ThIIE
C4&94= OF THE JUDICAL CONI
COURTS, U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE (3d ed., 1991). Among its recommendations is that "courtroom
space and circulation paths in the vicinity of the judge's bench, deputy clerk and law clerk, court reporter/recorder stations, and the witness box should be designed to accommodate handicapped ramps,
lifts, or other required apparatus as they are needed." Id. at 97.
207. See 57 Fed. Reg. 60612, to be codifed at 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191 (1992). ADAAG. 28 C.F.R.
pt. 36 app. A (1993).
208. 57 Fed. Reg. at 60623.
209. 28 C.F.R. §35.160(a) (1993).
210. 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.160 (1993).
211. 28 C.F.R. § 35.106 (1993); see also 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.106 (1993).
212. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2) (1993). Deference to the request of the individual with a disability is preferred because of the range of disabilities, the variety of auxiliary aids and services, and
the different circumstances requiring effective communication. 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.160 (1993).
213. 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.160 (1993).
214. 28 C.F.R. § 35.164 (1993). The DOJ has provided some interesting guidance which may
suggest significant changes on the horizon relative to auxiliary aids. For example, consider the following in the context of accommodating people with hearing problems:
[s]ome courtrooms are now equipped for 'computer-assisted transcripts,' which allow
virtually instantaneous transcripts of courtroom argument and testimony to appear on displays. Such a system might be an effective auxiliary aid or service for a person who is
deaf or has a hearing loss who uses speech to communicate, but may be useless for some-
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To clarify this process consider the following example. Among
the auxiliary aids and services listed by the DOJ are qualified interpreters.2" 5 According to the DOJ Technical Assistance Manual, a public entity "should provide ...
[an] individual who is deaf . .

.

an interpreter who is able to sign to
effectively, accurately, and impartial-

ly, through the use of any necessary specialized vocabulary." 216 What
may be effective, accurate, and impartial will depend on the needs of
the individual to be assisted as well as the circumstances in which the
communication is to take place. There are instances where literal
transmission is required, e.g., in order for a person with a hearing
disability to be able to meet statutory fluency requirements for jury
service.2 7 Consequently, qualified interpreters versed in several systems may be required by a court as the circumstances demand.2"'
Another DOJ rule requires that when a public entity communicates with people by telephone, a special device for the deaf, commonly referred to as a TDD,219 or other, equally effective systems
must also be available.22 The concern expressed in the rules is that

people who use or require TDD's should not be inhibited from communicating with a public entity. 2 1 Title IV of the ADA does allow the
establishment of telephone relay services to serve as a link between
those who communicate by TDD and those who use telephones.222

one who uses sign language .... Although in some circumstances a note pad and written
materials may be sufficient to permit effective communication, in other circumstances they
may not be sufficient. For example, a qualified interpreter may be necessary when the
information being communicated is complex, or is exchanged for a lengthy period of time.

Generally, factors to be considered in determining whether an interpreter is required include the context in which the communication is taking place, the number of people in-

volved, and the importance of the communication.
28 C.F.R. app. § 35.160 (1993).
215. 28 C.F.R § 35.104 (1993).
216. DOJ TECHNICAL ASsiSTANCE MANUAL § 1I-7.1200.

217. E.g., WYo. STAT. § 1-11-101(a)(iii) (1988).
218. There are a number of sign language systems in use-the two most common are American
Sign Language and Signed English. A person may be familiar with one system and not another. In
addition, it is significant to note that American Sign Language is a separate language from English,
with its own grammar and syntax. The person who acts as an intermediary using this system acts as
would any foreign language interpreter, and consequently paraphrasing is common, and literal transmission unimportant. In contrast, signed English is not a separate language, but rather English in a
different form, i.e., hand signals represent the exact words used by the speaker. See Randy Lee,
Equal Protectionand Deaf Person'sRight to Serve as a Juror, 17 REV. OF LAW AND SOC. CHANGE 81,
100-02 (1989-90).
219. A TDD is a typewriter-style device that sends a typed message. 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.161
(1993).
220. 28 C.F.R. § 35.161 (1993).
221. 28 C.F.R. app. § 35.161 (1993).
222. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (Supp. III 1991). This service requires an operator using both a standard
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Accordingly, a publicized relay system which allows people with
disabilities to effectively communicate with a state or local governmental entity may meet the "equally effective system" requirement."'
4. Jury Selection

4

The ADA creates a special concern for courts in connection with
jury service. The United States Supreme Court has observed that
"[c]ompetence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an assessment
of individual qualifications and ability impartially to consider evidence
presented at a trial."' The statutory juror competency test in Wyoming conforms to that view: "a person is competent to act as juror if
he is: [i]n possession of his natural faculties, of ordinary intelligence
and without mental or physical infirmity preventing satisfactory jury

service. ""
In light of these statements, one might rephrase the juror selection rule in Wyoming as follows: competence to serve as a juror must
be based on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability to
impartially consider evidence presented at a trial, with or without
accommodation, including the provision of auxiliary aids.227 Notions of
equal protection would also seem to support such a rephrased rule.
The Fourteenth Amendment requires that people be treated equally under the law. 2" According to the United States Supreme Court,
equal protection forbids exclusion from jury service of at least some

telephone and a TDD to type the voice messages to the TDD user and read the TDD messages to the
standard telephone user.
223. It should be noted, however, that this allowance was made over the objections of "many
commentators." Detractors argued that public entities should not rely heavily on relay services because they do not provide effective access to all phone services. Among the examples they cited were
increasingly popular automated systems that allow the caller to respond by pushing the buttons of a
touch tone phone. With such devices, they argued, relay systems cannot operate fast enough to convey many messages within the time available with many answering machines. 28 C.F.R. app. §
35.161 (1993).
224. Several informative articles pertaining to jury service and people with disabilities have
been written. E.g., Harold Craig Manson, Comment, Jury Selection: The Courts, The Constitution,
and the Deaf, 2 PACIFIC L. J. 967 (1980); Michael B. Goldbas. Comment, Due Process: The Deaf and
the Blind as Jurors, 17:1 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 119 (1981); and Lee, supra note 218.
225. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
226. WYO. STAT. § 1-1 1-101(a)(ii) (1988).
227. Compare the rule which was in issue in Galloway v. Superior Court of the District of
Columbia, 816 F. Supp. (D.D.C. 1993). There the Court ruled that a policy which automatically
excludes blind people from jury service violates the ADA, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1871.
228. No state may "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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groups: "[p]eople excluded from juries because of their race are as
much aggrieved as those indicted and tried by juries chosen under a
system of racial exclusion."'9 Furthermore, the Court has observed
the possibility that jury service involves not only the rights of parties,
but the rights of potential jurors: "[w]hether jury service be deemed a
right, a privilege, or a duty, the state may no more extend it to some
citizens and deny it to others on racial grounds than it may invidiously
discriminate in the offering and withholding of the elective franchise."3 0 Consequently, the door may be gradually opening for people
with disabilities to assert that their right to jury service should receive
greater protection.
Historically, a key consideration for the federal judiciary in deciding on appropriate equal protection analysis23 ' has been the political
powerlessness of the group affected by the action under review. Although it has been argued that people with disabilities are properly
described as politically powerless, the Supreme Court has not recognized them as a suspect class,232 which means that their systematic
exclusion, unlike the plaintiffs in Carter, 1 3 is not yet entitled to strict
scrutiny. However, the legislative and executive branches of the federal government, in enacting and approving the ADA, may have taken
an important first step in changing that.
The ADA expressly recognizes that people with disabilities are
among the most repressed in our society:

229. Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970).
230. 396 U.S. at 330. Carter was the first case to reach the Court in which an attack upon
alleged racial discrimination in choosing juries was made by a potential juror, rather than by a defendant challenging a judgment of criminal conviction on the ground of systematic juror exclusion. Id. at
329.
231. Generally, a governmental classification which discriminates is presumed to be valid and
will be sustained by a court if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. See New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). A middle level of review has been held to be appropriate
however, when a classification concerns certain characteristics (e.g., gender), and does not involve a
"fundamental" right. In such cases the classification will be sustained if a court determines that the
discrimination serves an important governmental interest. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Furthermore, when discrimination occurs on the basis of race, alienage, or national origin, what have
been referred to as "suspect classifications," or involves a fundamental right such as voting, the court
will apply the highest level of review, the strict scrutiny test. This means that the action under review
must promote a compelling governmental interest which cannot be achieved by less discriminatory
means. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See generally JAMES A.
KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION 1-28 (1988), and Gayle L. Pettinga, Note, RationalBasiswith
Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987).
232. The Court has held that mentally retarded people are not a suspect class because they are
not "all cut from the same pattern." City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985).
233. 396 U.S. at 329.
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unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of
disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination; . . . individuals with disabilities are a discrete and

insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and
limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness
in our society

. . .

resulting from stereotype assumptions not

truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals."

34

Accordingly, as one of its purposes, the ADA announces that it is
intended "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment... in order to address
of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
the major areas
235
disabilities. ,
A related awareness may be developing with the use and monitoring of peremptory challenges to potential jurors. A peremptory
challenge is an arbitrary removal or striking of a juror by a party,
distinct from a party's right to have a juror removed for cause, and
may be employed to excuse a potential juror without any showing that
the individual is biased or prejudiced.236 Such challenges, however,
have recently come under fire beginning with the case of Batson v.
Kentucky.237
Batson involved a criminal trial in which the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike all of the black members on the venire,
and, as a result, the jury which was selected consisted of only white
people.23 The jury found Batson guilty. When the case reached the
Supreme Court it reversed the conviction, holding that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a prosecutor from using peremptory challenges
to exclude potential jurors solely because of their race, or the bald
assumption that black jurors as a group would be unable to impartially
consider the government's case. 23 9

The Court has since extended the holding in Batson so that
whether a defendant and the excluded jurors are of the same race is

234. 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(4) & (7) (Supp. III 1991).
235.

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (Supp. III 1991).

236.
237.
238.
239.

See generally 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 233.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Id. at 83.
Id. at 89.
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now irrelevant.24" Later the holding was made applicable to civil cases, 241 and most recently the Court held that Batson objections can be
used against criminal defendants as well as by them.242
The Supreme Court has not held that jury service is a fundamental right, and therefore that its regulation is subject to the equal protection strict scrutiny test. However, it has observed that because race is
unrelated to fitness, when the state denies a person participation in
jury service on account of his or her race, it unconstitutionally discriminates against the excluded juror. 243 The same would seem to be
true of a person's physical or mental impairments, provided, that with
the assistance of such auxiliary aids, the person is competent to serve.
Purposeful exclusion, the Court held in Powers v. Ohio, undermines
public confidence and "[t]he overt wrong, often apparent to the entire
jury panel, casts doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and
indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial of the
cause." 2' Georgia v. McCollum goes on to hold that "if a court allows
jurors to be excluded because of group bias, it is a willing participant
in a scheme that could only undermine the very foundation of our
system of justice-our citizens' confidence in it." 2' Again, this logic
would seem to apply in the case of a person with a disability, whom,
as pointed out, the ADA seeks to have fully integrate into society.
The Court has reaffirmed the view that peremptory challenges are
not a constitutionally protected right: "the right to a peremptory challenge may be withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional
guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair trial." 2' The desire to avoid
the exclusion of people with disabilities, unless a party can articulate
some justification, may, over time, become recognized as more important and fundamental than continuing the practice of allowing unchecked peremptory challenges.
V. TITLE Il-PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS

Title III of the ADA deals with private business enterprise and
prohibits the exclusion of people with disabilities which results from

240.
241.
242.

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 11I S.Ct. 2077 (1991).
Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992).

243. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
244.
245.
246.

Powers, 499 U.S. at 426.
McCollum, 112 S.Ct. at 2354.
Id. at 2359.
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physically inaccessible facilities.247 Its protection is directed to patrons,
would-be patrons and visitors of the business and commercial community, rather than employees and prospective employees who are subjects of Title 1.248

This Title is comprehensive, aiming at the provision of goods,
services, facilities, privileges and advantages, all of which are collectively referred to for convenience as accommodations. 49 The requirement is that business facilities be designed, constructed, and, in some
instances altered, and that activities be conducted so as to assure accessibility for individuals with disabilities." Congress charged the
DOJ with public enforcement of Title III, ' with the exception of its
transportation-related aspects, which were made the responsibility of
the Department of Transportation. 2
Title III is directed toward all members of the business community. Unlike Title I, it does not exempt entities employing a small number of employees; however, as discussed below, since a means-test of
sorts is used to determine what is required of an entity, somewhat different standards may apply depending upon a public accommodation's
resources.

The ADA identifies twelve categories of facilities included within
the definition of "public accommodation." 3 By its terms, the Act

247. 42
248. 28
12117 (Supp.
249. 28
250. 42

U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189
C.F.R. app. B § 36.304
III 1991), and discussed
C.F.R. app. B § 36.101
U.S.C. §§ 12182-12183

(Supp. I1 1991).
(1993). Title I of the ADA is found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111supra in notes 63-144 and accompanying text.
(1993).
(Supp. I1 1991).

251. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b) (Supp. III 1991). See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (Supp. III 1991) (regarding the DOJ's responsibility to develop rules implementing the Title). DOJ rules, 28 C.F.R. §§
36.101-36.608 (1993); the explanatory appendix, 28 C.F.R. at 36 app. B (1993); the DOJ TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL; and the ADA HANDBOOK, published jointly by the DOJ and the EEOC, are chief
sources of information concerning the public accommodation-related details of Title 1lI.
252.
253.

42 U.S.C. § 12186(a) (Supp. III 1991).
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (Supp. 111 1991). They can be described as follows:
1.
places of lodging;
2.
establishments serving food or drink;

3.

places of exhibition or entertainment;

4.

places of public gathering;

5.

sales or rental establishments;

6.
7.
8.

service establishments;
stations used for specified public transportation;
places of public display and collection;

9.
10.

places of recreation;
places of education:

11.
12.

social service centers; and,
places of exercise,
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acknowledges the constitutional requirement that, to be covered by the
law, such facilities must affect interstate commerce. 24 However, recognizing the integrated nature of the national economy, "commerce" is
defined in the same broad manner as in Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. 5 As a result, expecting an exemption from the law's coverage under the argument that commerce is not affected can rarely, if
ever, be relied upon.
Even if an entity does not fall within one of the twelve categories
of public accommodation, it may still qualify as a "commercial facility" and therefore be subject to the new construction and alteration requirements of Title III. A commercial facility is one which affects
commerce and is intended for non-residential use. 6 Commercial facilities that do not meet the definition of public accommodation are not
subject to all of the Title III requirements .2 7 In providing this exemption to existing commercial facilities, Congress recognized that the
public generally does not visit such facilities, and that protection is in
place for the employees of such facilities by virtue of Title I. Furthermore, there is a built in incentive to address accessibility; "to the
extent that new facilities are built in a manner that make[s] them accessible to all individuals, including potential employees, there will be
less of a need for individual employers to engage in reasonable accommodations for particular employees.
A. New Construction
The federal government expects that "over time, access will be
the rule rather than the exception."" In the short run, the DOJ sought
to strike a balance between guaranteeing access to people with disabilities on the one hand, and the financial resources of the business
and commercial sectors on the other.' 6 As a result, the ADA establish-

254. 42 U.S.C. 12181(7) (Supp. 1111991).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(1) (Supp. I1 1991). The Act prohibits discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin. See 28 C.F.R. app. B § 36.104

(1993) for a detailed discussion of the term "commerce,"
256. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(2) (Supp. III 1991). Several examples of commercial facilities are
provided by DOJ: factories, warehouses, office buildings, wholesale establishments that sell exclusively to other businesses, and private airports. 28 C.F.R. app. B § 36.104 (1993).

257. E.g., requirements concerning non-discrimination generally and the provision of auxiliary
aids. 28
258.
No. 485,
259.

C.F.R. app. B § 36.104 (1993)
Id. (quoting from the report of the HOUSE COMMITrEEON EDUCATION AND LABOR, H.R. REP.
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, at 117 (1990)).
See 28 C.F.R. app. B, Subpart D (1993).

260. Id.
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es different standards for previously existing facilities and those which
were, or are, to be constructed or altered.
" ' facilities which are
Except in several limited circumstances, 26
built for first occupancy to begin after January 26, 1993, must meet
the ADAAG 262 requirements. In addition, alterations 263 to existing
required to meet the stanfacilities made after January 26, 1992, are
264
feasible."
extent
"maximum
the
to
dards

The rules expressly recognize that unique characteristics of terrain may prevent the incorporation of accessibility features in new
construction.265 Similarly, in some existing facilities, the rules anticipate that it may be impossible to fully comply with the accessibility
standards through a planned alteration. 2" In both cases, the rules indicate that these exemptions are to be narrowly interpreted.267
B. Existing Facilities
Of more immediate concern to a public accommodation is the requirement that it may need to remove existing physical barriers.268 In
addition, a public accommodation must modify its policies, practices,
and procedures and provide auxiliary aids and services to afford access
to its goods, services, facilities, privileges, or advantages, unless to do
so would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, or advantages.269 Finally, public accommodations are
required to eliminate eligibility requirements that tend to screen out
people with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying what it is the
entity provides, unless such are absolutely necessary.27
A public accommodation is obligated to remove existing barriers
if removal is "readily achievable. ''271 That term refers to removal

261. 28 C.F.R. § 36.401 (1993).
262. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. A (1993).

263. An "alteration" is a change which affects or could affect usability or access by people with
disabilities. 28 C.F.R. § 36.402(b) (1993).
264. 28 C.F.R. § 36.402(c) (1993).
265. For example, where a building must be constructed on stilts because of its location in

marshlands or over water. The exception is not intended for "hilly" terrain or a plot of land with a
steep grade where, according to the DOJ, physical integrity of a facility would not be impaired by
providing
266.
267.
268.

accessibility. See 28 C.F.R. app. B § 36.401(c) (1993).
28 C.F.R. § 36.402(c) (1993).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (Supp. 1111991).

269. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). (iii) (Supp. III 1991).
270. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1111991),
271. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (Supp. 1111991).
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which can be accomplished without much difficulty or expense, to be
determined by an examination, on a case-by-case basis, of each
entity's financial capabilities. 72 Even if a business can demonstrate
that barrier removal is not readily achievable, it retains the obligation
to search for alternative methods of providing access to its goods and
services, and to employ those methods if they are readily achievable.273
An additional concern for a public accommodation seeking to
assure accessibility is the dictate that separate but equal accommodations will generally be considered inadequate. Instead, a public accommodation is required to provide whatever it is that the business
provides in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the
individuals who are sought to be protected by the ADA.274
C. Direct Threat
A public accommodation may deny an individual with a disability
participation in or benefit of its goods, services, facilities, privileges,
and advantages, if a direct threat-i.e., a significant risk-to the health
or safety of others would be created, and which could not be eliminated through reasonable measures. 2 75 This rule differs from the direct
threat standard under Title I which speaks to a risk to either the protected individual or others.276 But like a claim of direct threat under
Title I, an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment
that relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence is required to support a claim of direct threat under
risk of injury to others must be not merely
Title III. In addition, 2the
77
possible, but probable.
One of the handful of ADA cases which has been decided dealt
with the concept of "direct threat" under Title III. In Anderson v.
Little League Baseball,27 the defendants had adopted a policy which in
effect excluded coaches who used wheelchairs, such as Anderson,
from the playing field.279 The district court held that the lack of an
individualized assessment, and policy "implementation without public
discourse, falls markedly short of the requirements" enunciated in the

U.S.C.
C.F.R.
U.S.C.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.

§ 12181(9) (Supp. III 1991).
§ 36.305 (1993).
§ 12182(b)(i)(B) (Supp. III 1991).
§ 36.208 (1993).
§ 1630.2(r) (1991). See also supra note 112.

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

42
28
42
28
29

277.

28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c) (1993).

278. 794 F. Supp. 342 (D.Ariz. 1992).
279. Id. at 343.
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Act and regulations.2 " An interactive approach and reliance upon
objective evidence would appear to have avoided the decision.
D. Remedies
When an individual, like the plaintiff in Anderson, files a complaint, the DOJ is required to investigate.2"' It is also required to conduct periodic Title III compliance reviews. The DOJ is authorized to
bring suit if it concludes that an entity is engaged in a pattern or practice of disability discrimination or if an allegation of discrimination
raises issues of general public importance. 2 2 The remedies available in
actions initiated by the Attorney General under Title III include injunction and civil penalties, not to exceed $50,000 for first violations and
$100,000 for subsequent violations.2 3 In addition, a court, if asked by
the DOJ, may award other relief including non-punitive money damages to private victims of discrimination.2
The more common enforcement mechanism, however, is expected
to be private suit. Individuals may commence an action if they are
being subjected to discrimination or if they have "reasonable grounds
for believing" that they are "about to be subjected to discrimination"
in violation of the Title. 28' As a result, a private individual could arguably prevent the construction of a shopping mall if he or she discovered that the plans failed to incorporate appropriate accessibility features. The remedies available are those provided in the Civil Rights
Act of 196426 and injunction. 287 Attorney fees and litigation expenses
are also recoverable from a private party, 8 as well as from the United
States .29
V.

CONCLUSION

Not so long ago, slavery was an accepted fact of life in this country. Although there was scattered resistance, most people believed that
280. Id. at 345.
281. 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (Supp. III 1991).
282. 28 C.F.R. § 36.503 (1993).
283. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2) (Supp. III 1991).
284. 28 C.F.R. § 36.504(a)(2), (c) (1993).
285. 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (Supp. III 1991).
286. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (Supp. III 1991). The pertinent provisions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 are found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1988).
287. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) (1990).
288. 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (Supp. III 1991).
289. 28 C.F.R. § 36.505 (1993).
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it could never be abandoned. Eighty-nine years after the colonists
declared their independence from Britain, the Thirteen Amendment to
the Constitution abolished the practice. The unfathomable became
reality, and although racism persists, slavery as it existed is certainly
no longer accepted, at least in America. Voting, a right once exclusively enjoyed by white males, presents a similar situation. In 1869,
the Wyoming Territorial Legislature made history by extending to
women the right to fully participate in all elections, and the next year
women began serving on Wyoming juries. 2" Forty-eight years later,
something that the Wyoming Legislature had been persuaded to declare
a fundamental right had still not gained general acceptance, and a
group of women spent six months in jail as a result of picketing the
White House on behalf of women's suffrage. 29 It was not until 1920,
with the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, that women became federally enfranchised. Today, we accept without question that a
woman may not be barred from a voting booth because of her gender.
The point of these examples is to show that our frame of reference can shift, and when it does, a society often forgets that what is
the norm today was believed impossible by some only yesterday. The
Americans with Disabilities Act is not the final solution to disabilitybased discrimination. It is, however, a substantial step toward addressing the problems of less-than-equal opportunity for a large segment of
society. Like other laws which have challenged assumptions and prejudices responsible for repressing various segments of our society, the
ADA will come to be seen as an integral, if not perfect, step toward a
better world.
All too seldom do we realize that as judges and lawyers we are
looked to not only for fairness and reason, but as examples-through
our conduct-of fairness and reason. On that ground alone, we should
carefully consider our efforts to comply with the ADA. Our actions
will invite understanding and cooperation, or indifference and contempt for this law's objective: that people with disabilities be treated
with dignity and respect by being judged as individuals on the basis of
ability rather than on the basis of irrational fears or patronizing attitudes.

290. TAFT A. LARSON, WYOMING, A HISTORY 79-84 (1977).
291. CAROLE L. CORBIN, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 79 (1985).
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